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UNITED STATES V NEWM4RK: SEMANTICS AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD,
DOES IT REALLY MATTER WHO WAS DECEIVED?
Debra Carfora+
Six days per week, an army of 596,000 U.S. postal employees deliver
approximately 584,000,000 pieces of mail.' Americans trust these postal
employees with their personal letters, business correspondence, and other
goods and materials, in part because the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution guarantees the peoples' privacy in these matters.2 A little-known
branch of the Post Office called the Postal Inspection Service (Inspection
Service) protects the integrity of the mails.3
However, as mail pours through post offices and commercial carriers around
the country, so do "attempts to cheat the public [through] fraudulent use of
[those] mails." 4  One of the major objectives of the Inspection Service is to
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author would also like to thank her parents, who challenge her to be her best without ever saying
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1. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, POSTAL FACTS 2010 4 (2010), available at
http://www.usps.com/strategicplanningLpdf/PostalFacts03_17_2010.pdf. The spirit and pride
of the U.S. mail carriers is captured by an inscription on the James A. Farley Building in New
York City: "Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift
completion of their appointed rounds." Id Although most often attributed as the official motto
of the U.S. Post Office, the inscription was adapted from the work of fifth-century Greek
historian Herodotus, whose words described Persian messengers of his time. JOHN UPTON
TERRELL, THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT: A STORY OF LETTERS, POSTAGE,
AND MAIL FRAUD 10-11 (1968) ("The Post Office Department has no official motto.").
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . ."); see also Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (granting the Fourth
Amendment rights which prevent any type of inspection or examination of the mail); ELINORE
DENNISTON, AMERICA'S SILENT INVESTIGATORS: THE STORY OF THE POSTAL INSPECTORS WHO
PROTECT THE UNITED STATES MAIL 12-13 (1964) (explaining that all mail-delivery methods are
protected from invasion by any person); TERRELL, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing the illegality of
any postal employee opening mailed packages).
3. See DENNISTON, supra note 2, at 14-15 (introducing the Postal Inspectors, their role in
the protection of the mails, and Americans' unfamiliarity with the organization's achievements).
4. TERRELL, supra note 1, at 59; see also Mail Fraud: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Postal Operations and Servs. of the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv., I 03d Cong. 1
(1993) [hereinafter Mail Fraud Hearings] (statement ofRep. Barbara-Rose Collins, Chairwoman,
Subcomm. on Postal Operations and Servs. of the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv.)
("Mail fraud is a problem affecting millions of Americans annually. Individual scams promoted
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"protect[] the American public from being victimized by fraudulent schemes
involving the mails."5 As a primary weapon in protecting the integrity of the
mails, the Inspector Service relies on the criminal mail fraud statute, which
makes it a felony to intentionally use the mails to defraud.
The wire fraud statute7 serves as a modem extension of the mail fraud
statute, and courts construe the two similarly.8 The federal mail and wire fraud
statutes function as important tools through which federal prosecutors may
keep pace with the modem evolution of new schemes and frauds.9 Congress's
power to regulate the federal post office and interstate communication wires
provides the constitutional basis for the mail and wire fraud statutes.' 0  As
judicial interpretation and application of the statute has evolved, however, the
required use of the mails (or wires) has been reduced to nothing more than a
"jurisdictional hook."" The broad language of the statutes gives federal
through the mail have been known nationally to affect over 15,000 victims at a time and causing
hundreds of millions of dollars in consumer losses annually.").
5. Mail Fraud Hearings, supra note 4, at 202 (statement of Kenneth Hearst, Deputy Chief,
Postal Inspector Serv.). Because the Inspection Service may only claim jurisdiction after use of
the mails is shown, the Inspection Service often shares information with other law-enforcement
agencies that have concurrent jurisdiction. Id at 202-03.
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006 & Supp. II 2009); Mail Fraud Hearings, supra note 4, at
202 (statement of Kenneth Hearst, Deputy Chief, Postal Inspector Serv.). The mail fraud statute
has enjoyed a much broader application outside the scope of the Inspection Service. For example,
by the end of 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated that it would charge
between ten and twenty percent of pending white-collar crime investigations with violations of
the mail fraud statute. Id. at 221 (statement of Frederick Verinder,. Deputy Assistant Director,
White Collar Crime, FBI).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. 112009).
8. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) ("The mail and wire fraud
statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to
both sets of offenses here."); Flo Messier & Kenneth A. Polite, Mail and Wire Fraud, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 881, 883 (1999) (discussing the overlap of character and scope between the mail
and wire fraud statutes); see also infra Part L.A (discussing the wire fraud statute as an extension
of the mail fraud statute).
9. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger observed:
Section 1341 of Title 18 U.S.C has traditionally been used against fraudulent activity as
a first line of defense. When a 'new' fraud develops-as constantly happens-the mail
fraud statute becomes a stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new
phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal
directly with the evil.
Id; see also Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DuQ. L. REV. 771, 771
(1980) ("To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius,
our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart-and our true love.").
10. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in
Ex Parte Jackson in which the Court explicitly held that Congress's constitutional authority to
regulate the postal system encompasses the power to regulate what is sent through the mails).
I1. See Brian C. Behrens, Note, 18 US.C. § 1341 and § 1346: Deciphering the Confusing
Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 489, 490 (1993) (noting how
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prosecutors the needed legal flexibility to pursue criminal liability against
those who use the mails or wires to perpetuate fraud upon others.12 However,
the constitutional concept of fair notice in criminal prosecutions has prompted
some courts to attempt to limit the vagueness of the statute through a very
narrow reading of its language. 13
Over the past 138 years, the circuit courts have divided both on what types
of "schemes" fall within the scope of the mail fraud statute and the degree to
which the mails need to be used in furtherance of the recognized schemes.14
Although no legislative history exists to reveal Congress's initial intent
regarding scope and reach, the statute itself has undergone three major
revisions expanding the reach of the statute, suggesting that Congress intended
the statute's scope to be broad.15  Additionally, periodic amendments to the
statute's language reversed the limiting and narrowing effects of judicial
decisions on the subject and evidence Congress's continued intent to maintain
the broad scope of the statute. 16
utilization has expanded such that "[t]he mail fraud statute, as it exists today, seems to require
only a minute link to the mail system").
12. See Mail Fraud Hearings, supra note 4, at 221 (statement of Frederick Verinder,
Deputy Assistant Director, White Collar Crime, FBI) ("[I]t is the mail fraud statute along with the
wire fraud statute that works so well, hand in hand, to provide the FBI a nexus into criminal
violations not specifically covered by the other Federal laws."); see also Behrens, supra note I1,
at 526 (reasoning that "in a society where an alarming number of ever-increasing crimes are
occurring, the prosecutors need at least one secret weapon").
13. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (quoting Fasulo v. United
States, 272 U.S. 620, 629 (1926)) (noting that in mail fraud cases, "[t]here are no constructive
offenses; and before one can be punished, it must be shown that his case is plainly within the
statute"), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102
Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). Because "the punishment of
a human being is a very serious matter, any doubt regarding the appropriateness of penal liability
should be resolved by narrowing its scope." JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF CRIMINAL
LAW 3-4 (The Law Book Exchange, 2d ed. 2005) (1960); see also Sara Sun Beale, Mail: Federal
Mail Fraud Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (Jan. 2002), http://www.encyclopedia.
com/doc/lG2-3403000171.html (discussing due process concerns raised by the common law
evolution of the mail fraud statute).
14. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 790-821 (tracing the early division between strict and broad
constructionist approaches, and interpretations of the various amendments to the mail fraud
statute up through the 1970s).
15. PETER W. Low & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 160-78 (1997)
(tracing the development of the mail fraud statute).
16. See infra section III.A.3 (demonstrating Congress's intent to foster the broad application
of the mail fraud statute through legislation as a reaction to key cases attempting to limit the
statute's reach); Behrens, supra note 11, at 495 (recognizing that in Durland v. United States, the
Court used the mail fraud statute "for controlling activities that were perhaps questionably outside
the scope of what the drafters had intended it to cover. Congress later codified the holding of
Durland, further solidifying the belief that the mail fraud statute could be extended in its
application"); see also infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing McNally's limitation
of the mail fraud statute to money or property and Congress's acquiescence to the Court's
invitation to expand the statute through additional legislation).
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Prosecutors must show only two elements to prove mail or wire fraud: (1)
the existence of a scheme to defraud; and (2) use of the mails or wires in
furtherance of that scheme.17  Neither the lanPuage of the statute nor the
extensive judicial interpretations define fraud;' therefore, the concept of a
scheme to defraud does not have a clear measurable standard outside of a
general "plan" with dishonest intention.19 The second element of the statute
requires only evidence of a casual relationship between the mailing (or use of
the wires) and the scheme; that is, the mailing itself need not be fraudulent. 20
Criminal jurisprudence generally disfavors criminal punishment in the
absence of a wrongful act. This widely accepted maxim causes tension in
mail fraud prosecutions that punish the "otherwise" legal act of mailing,
22combined with only a mere intent to defraud. Some courts rely on a strict
interpretation of the statute's language as a way to avoid extending the statute
beyond the inherent boundaries of criminal prosecution into areas not
envisioned by Congress. 23 This type of textual interpretation has prompted the
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) ("Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or artifice to
defraud . . . [and] for the purpose of executing such scheme ... deposits or causes to be deposited
any matter or thing . . . to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate
carrier . . . shall be fined under this title .... ); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954)
(laying out the elements of mail fraud). Pereira v. United States was a critical case for the
development of the mail fraud statute because it was the first time the Supreme Court identified
the main elements of the offense. Behrens, supra note I1, at 498-99 (1993).
18. See Beale, supra note 13. However, the Court has indicated the statute "is not limited
by the common law definition of fraud." ELLEN S. PODGOR & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, WHITE
COLLAR CRIME IN A NUT SHELL 60 (4th ed. 2009).
19. See, e.g., PODGOR & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 60 (noting that a scheme to defraud
implies that the defendant have a fraudulent intent); Mark Zingale, Fashioning a Victim Standard
in Mail and Wire Fraud: Ordinarily Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 795, 800 (1999) (explaining that fraudulent intent may be inferred from a
scheme to defraud "because schemes are by definition not accidental but deliberate plans").
20. See Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8 ("It is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the use of
the mails as an essential element."); see also Zingale, supra note 19, at 800 (discussing how the
existence of an incidental nexus between a mailing and a scheme to defraud sufficiently satisfies
the second element of the statute).
21. See Hales v. Petit, (1562) 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (C.B.) [397] ("For the imagination of the
mind to do wrong, without an act done, is not punishable in our law .... ); HALL, supra note 13,
at 185-87 (discussing the principle of concurrence, which manifests the idea that "criminal
conduct, not thinking or movement or both of them unrelated to each other, is required to incur
criminal liability"); see also Rakoff, supra note 9, at 775 (providing that "devising a scheme to
defraud-is not itself conduct at all . . . but is simply a plan, intention, or state of mind,
insufficient in itselfto give rise to any kind of criminal sanctions").
22. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 776 (discussing how connections between the elements of
mail fraud function to link defendants to an innocent act that has only minute consequences).
23. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (refusing to "construe the
statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials,"
interpreting the mail fraud statute "as limited in scope to the protection of property
rights . . .," and inviting Congress to express its intent more clearly if it desired the statute to
[Vol. 60:779782
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Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits to limit the mail fraud statute by
requiring evidence of a direct misrepresentation to the intended victim to
sustain a conviction for mail and wire fraud.24 Recently, however, the Third
Circuit upheld a wire fraud conviction against Brian Newmark who made
misrepresentations to Morgan Stanley during his scheme to defraud Arthur and
Thomas Walker of money; Morgan Stanly was a third party not a target of the
fraudulent scheme.25 Newmark petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari
claiming that the Third Circuit erred in affirming his conviction, and instead,
should have taken an approach similar to that taken by the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits.26  The Supreme Court denied Newmark's petition.27  For
over twenty years, the circuits have disagreed whether misrepresentations
made to someone other than the intended victim of a scheme to defraud are
enough to sustain a conviction for federal mail or wire fraud. This
disagreement can be attributed to the statute's turbulent judicial history
28
regarding the scope and extent of its reach.
This Note begins with a general discussion of the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes and depicts the historical evolution of the statutes' current forms. The
Note goes on to review judicial interpretations of the statutory phrase "scheme
to defraud" and then traces twenty years of conflicting decisions in the circuit
courts regarding the extent of misrepresentation required to sustain a
conviction for federal mail or wire fraud. Next, the Note analyzes the Third
Circuit's decision in United States v. Newmark, concluding that the court
correctly applied a broad interpretation of the statute. Finally, this Note
concludes that the historical context in which Congress wrote the statutes, the
language of the statutes themselves, and Congress's reaction to judicial
treatment of the statutes indicate that judicial interpretation of the mail and
wire fraud statutes must appreciate their broad scope and preserve
prosecutorial discretion to punish sophisticated frauds designed by imaginative
have a broader scope), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)); see
also Zingale, supra note 19, at 800 (noting the "tendency of some courts to construe the statute
relatively strictly").
24. See infra notes 76-102 and accompanying text. Misrepresentation rises to the level of
fraudulent activity when enough reckless disregard for the truth or a concealment of information
pertinent to the decision-making process exists. Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Note,
Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703, 712-13 (1994).
25. United States v. Newmark, 374 F. App'x 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2010).
26. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16-18, Newmark v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 299
(2010) (No. 10-123).
27. Newmark v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 299 (2010).
28. See infra Part I (discussing the historical battle between the lower courts as to the scope
and reach of the mail fraud statute); see also infra Part II (tracing the modem conflict between the
lower courts that disagree whether misrepresentations to third parties falls within the purview of
the federal mail or wire fraud statutes).
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swindlers by not requiring a direct misrepresentation to the intended victim of
a scheme to defraud.
I. ORIGINS OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
The Reconstruction era, the time period following the end of the Civil War,
was "one of the most turbulent and controversial eras in American History." 29
The country was in economic and political turmoil, and the federal
government, charged with rebuilding the nation, began extending its reach of
authority over rights traditionally belonging to the states. 30 As the wealth and
economic growth of the nation began to ex and, so too did bribery, fraud, and
swindles through the U.S. Postal Service. 1 In 1872, Congress enacted the
mail fraud statute as part of an overhaul of the Postal Service; the original
language of the statute was intended to prevent the use of the Postal Service to
perpetrate frauds by establishing a penalty for its misuse.32  The Supreme
Court preempted any challenge to the mail fraud statute in 1877, declaring in
Ex Parte Jackson that "[t]he power possessed by Congress embraces the
regulation of the entire postal system of the country." 33
29. America's Reconstruction: People and Politics After the Civil War, DIGITAL HISTORY
(2003) http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/reconstruction/introductionhtml.
30. See RICHARD E. LEVY, THE POWER TO LEGISLATE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 12 (Jack Stark ed., 2006) (explaining that "the Civil War and
reconstruction saw both the assertion of federal sovereignty as dominant over states and the
expansion of federal legislative power"); Rakoff, supra note 9, at 779 & n.41 (listing legislation
aimed at mending the widespread social and economic problems prevalent immediately following
the Civil War); see also Beale, supra note 13 (discussing how legislation like the mail fraud
statute departed from the traditional notion of the federal government's role in criminal-law
sanctions).
31. See TERRELL, supra note 1, at 59 (explaining that before 1872, because no federal
statute addressing mail fraud yet existed, victims had nowhere to turn).
32. MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN, PROTECTING WITH DISTINCTION: A POSTAL INSPECTION
HISTORY OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE 2 (U.S. Postal Inspection Service 1999); TERRELL,
supra note 1, at 60. The language of the original statute reads in part:
[A]ny person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or be effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or communication
with any other person . . . by means of the post-office establishment of the United
States, or by inciting such other person to open communication with the person so
devising or inteuding [sic], shall, in and for executing snch [sic] scheme or artifice ...
place any letter or packet in any post-office of the United States, or take or received any
therefrom, such person, so misusing the post-office establishment, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor ... and shall propertion [sic] the punishment especially to the degree in
which the abuse of the post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such
fraudulent scheme and device.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(2006 & Supp. II 2009)).
33. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877). Jackson was charged and convicted of
mailing circulars advertising an illegal lottery under § 3894 of the United States Revised Statutes.
Id. at 728. The "lottery laws," which were among the first attempts by Congress to prevent the
use of the mails in furtherance of fraudulent purposes, prohibited mailing "any letters or circulars
784 [Vol. 60:779
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Nonetheless, constitutional concerns regarding the extent of Congress's
power to prevent fraud through regulation of the mails provoked immediate
disagreement among the lower courts.34 Some courts interpreted the
"mail-emphasizing" language of the statute as limiting its reach to include only
those "frauds" dependent on use of the mails,35 while other courts more
broadly interpreted the statute as encompassing any "scheme" in which the
mails were used.36  In 1889, Congress attempted to remove the confusion
among the lower courts by amending the statute to include a list of prohibited
schemes.37  However, subsequent judicial analysis, relying on a strict textual
concerning lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes of any
kind on any pretext whatever." Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006)). For many years, Congress was determined to find a way to
regulate the mails. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 779-82. After Congress passed section 3894 and
Jackson was subsequently convicted under this Act, he petitioned the Supreme Court,
complaining Congress lacked the power to regulate what was sent through the mails and so his
conviction under the Act was unconstitutional. Jackson, 96 U.S. at 728. A unanimous Court
disagreed, finding that Congress derived its ability to take "all measures necessary to secure its
safe and speedy transit" from its power "to establish post-offices and post-roads." Id. at 732. In
concluding that "[tihe right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the right to
determine what shall be excluded," the Supreme Court extended to Congress the broad ability to
regulate "what shall constitute mail matter." Id.
34. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 789-90 (describing how the broad language in Ex Parte
Jackson led to the development of two different interpretational approaches the mail fraud
statute). Compare United States v. Owens, 17 F. 72, 74 (E.D. Mo. 1883) (limiting the scope of
the statute to only schemes where mail is central to the fraud), with United States v. Jones, 10 F.
469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (construing the statute broadly to include any fraud where the mail
is used).
35. See, e.g., Owens, 17 F. at 74 ("[T]he act was designed to strike at common schemes of
fraud, whereby, through the post-office, circulars, etc., are distributed, generally to entrap and
defraud the unwary, and not the supervision of commercial correspondence solely between a
debtor and creditor."); see also Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 163-64. Those courts relied
on a strict textual interpretation of the statute and "required that the mail be central to the
perpetration of the fraud and limited the kinds of schemes to which the statute applied." Id
36. See, e.g., Jones, 10 F. at 470 ("[A] scheme to defraud any person upon whom the bad
money might be passed . . . is within the scope of the statute, although no particular person had
been selected as the subject of its operation. Any scheme, the necessary result of which would be
the defrauding of somebody, is a scheme to defraud within the meaning of [the statute] . . . .");
see also LOW & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 165. Those courts read the statute as a whole, and
found "that the 'gist' of the mail fraud offense [was] the mailing-not, perhaps surprisingly, the
fraud." Id. at 165 n.i.
37. The amended language reads in part:
[A]ny person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, or distribute, supply, or furnish,
or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, bank notes, paper money,
or any obligation or security of the United States or of any State, Territory,
municipality, company, corporation, or person, or anything represented to be or
intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious articles, or any scheme or
artifice to obtain money by or through correspondence, by what is commonly called the
"sawdust swindle," or "counterfeit money fraud," or by dealing or pretending to deal in
what is commonly called "green articles," "green coin," "bills," "paper goods,"
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interpretation, used the amended language to suggest that Congress intended to
include within the statute's reach only those schemes specifically mentioned.
On the other hand, courts supporting a broader interpretation read the amended
language as evidence that Congress initially intended the statute to apply to the
kinds of schemes broad constructionists already found to be within the statute's
reach.39
In 1896, the Supreme Court first interpreted the phrase "scheme to defraud"
in Durland v. United States.40 John Durland was convicted of mail fraud for a
scheme in which he used the mail to solicit investments in phony bonds.
Durland argued that his conviction rested on some future intent and, therefore,
could not stand because a fraudulent act or misrepresentation had not yet
occurred.42 The Supreme Court, however, recognized that Durland had been
indicted based on the finding that he intended to cheat innocent victims of their
money, and that this activity was specifically the type of activity Congress
"spurious Treasury notes," "United States goods", "green cigars", or any other names
or terms intended to be understood as relating to such counterfeit or spurious
articles . . . by means of the Post-Office Establishment of the United States . . . such
person so misusing the post-office establishment shall, upon conviction, be punishable
by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for not more than
eighteen months ....
Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873, 873 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(2006 & Supp. I 2009)); see also Behrens, supra note 11, at 494 (noting that by the amendment,
Congress hoped "to better define the, types of situations in which [the statute] should be applied").
38. See, e.g., United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160, 161 (D. Colo. 1895) ("The general language
of the act must be limited to such schemes and artifices as are ejusdem generis with those [acts
enumerated in the statute]."). Those adhering to a strict interpretation of the language in the
statute read the "scheme to defraud" term as disjunctive to the added list of schemes, interpreting
this to be indicative of congressional intent to sustain a narrow reading of the term "scheme to
defraud," while adding a specified list of schemes that should be prohibited in addition to the
scheme to defraud. Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 169.
39. See, e.g., Milby v. United States, 120 F. 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1903) (holding that the
amendment was not intended to curtail the statute's application to only the enumerated acts).
These courts merely found the amendment as irrefutable validation of acts that Congress always
intended to be included within the statute. Rakoff, supra note 9, at 809.
40. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896); see McNally v. United States, 483
U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (noting that Durland was "the first case in which this Court construed the
meaning of the phrase 'any scheme or artifice to defraud"'), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
41. Durland, 161 U.S. at 307-09, 312. John Durland was the President of Provident Bond
& Investment Company. Id. at 309. He used the mail to secure monthly investments in his
company's bonds. Id. His conviction was based on the absolute intention that the bonds would
never mature and his victims would never realize the promised redemption amounts. Id. at
308-09.
42. Id at 312-13. For a discussion of the general principle of criminal law that a person
cannot be convicted of criminal "intent" without some overt act, see supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
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sought to prevent. 43 The Court concluded that the mail fraud statute must be
read as including "everything designed to defraud by representations as to the
past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future."" Although the
language used in Durland supported a broad reading of the statute, the holdin
itself narrowly defined only the "scheme to defraud" language of the statute.4
Because of this contradicting dichotomy, the disagreement between the lower
courts waged on.46 In 1909, Congress once again stepped in and amended the
mail fraud statute's language to reflect the broad, conclusory language in
Durland.47 The amended language of the statute not only added the words "or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises," but, more significantly, Congress eliminated the
48mail-focused language.
A. Modern Expansions of an Antique Statute
Although the 1909 amendment was the last substantive amendment to the
mail fraud statute,49 the language and effect of the statute has been ex anded
over the past century to reflect the changes in modem civilization. For
43. Durland, 161 U.S. at 314.
44. Id at 313.
45. See id at 312-14 (stating that the question squarely in front of the court was whether
"the statute reaches only such [schemes] as . . . would come within the definition of 'false
pretenses"'); see also Rakoff, supra note 9, at 811-12 (discussing the broad conclusory language
of Durland in contrast with its narrow holding).
46. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 812 (discussing how the Court's opinion in Durland
supported a broad interpretation of the statute, while not foreclosing a narrow interpretation, thus
allowing lower courts to continue to advance opposing interpretations).
47. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130-31 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006 & Supp. 112009)); Durland, 161 U.S. at 312-14; see also Rakoff, supra
note 9, at 811-12, 816 (explaining that the 1909 Act eliminated any support for a narrow
interpretation of the statute). The amended language reads in part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed, any letter, postal card, package,
writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, whether addressed to any person residing
within or outside the United States, in any post-office, or station thereof, or street or
other letter box of the United States, or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent
or delivered by the post-office establishment of the United States, or shall take or
receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United
States ... shall be fined ....
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 215.
48. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 215. For a discussion of the 1909 amendment, see McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(2006)); Rakoff, supra note 9, at 816.
49. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 357 n.6.
50. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (outlining the expansion of chapter 63 of
title 18 of the United States Code).
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example, in 1948, Congress amended the statute for the sole purpose and effect
of eliminating the nineteenth-century language complicating the text;si in
1970, Congress amended the language of the statute to reflect globalization of
the post office by substituting "Postal Service" for "Post Office Department"; 52
and, in 1994, Congress amended the language of the statute to apply to
commercial mail services, which now operate as competition for the U.S.
Postal Service.53
Additionally, Congress expanded chapter 63 of title 18 of the United States
Code to include §§ 134354 and 1346.'" Section 1343, the wire fraud statute,
mirrors the mail fraud statute, but requires the means of executing a scheme to
include "wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce."56 Section 1346 was intended to expand the reach of "schemes to
defraud" to "intangible right[s] of honest services."57 This section was enacted
as a direct response to the Supreme Court's holding in McNally v. United
States.5 s
Charles McNally, James Gray, and Howard Hunt were involved in a scheme
designed to funnel insurance commissions through third-party entities with
51. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1341, 62 Stat. 683, 763 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1341) (2006)). The Historical and Revision notes of § 1341, discussing the 1948
amendment, state that Congress intended the amendment to update the statute and eliminate
superfluous language. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (Historical and Revision Notes).
52. Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 12, 84 Stat. 719, 778 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)).
53. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)).
Letters and packages being sent in the furtherance of a scheme to defraud through commercial
carriers, such as Federal Express and UPS, now fall within the reach of the mail fraud statute. See
PODGOR & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 68. The current language of the statute reads in part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits
or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any
private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter
or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to
whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341.
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (added July 16, 1952).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (added Nov. 18, 1988).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see PODGOR & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 73 (discussing the
similarities between the mail fraud statute and the wire fraud statute).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
58. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (indicating that Congress passed § 1346 in
response to the Supreme Court's demand in McNally to speak more clearly about whether
"intangible rights" are included in the definition of "scheme to defraud").
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which they were associated. 59  As Secretary of Public Protection and
Regulation and Secretary of the Governor of Kentucky's cabinet, Gray
supervised Kentucky's insurance policies, and, as chairman of Kentucky's
Democratic Party, Hunt controlled the selection of the state's insurance policy
provider.60 In the interest of maintaining their existing position as the state's
insurance provider, Wombwell Insurance Company offered to "share any
resulting commissions in excess of $50,000 a year with other insurance
agencies specified by [Hunt]." 6 1  Hunt and Gray formed investment
companies, which McNally operated, and then identified those companies
among the agencies that would share in the Wombwell commissions.62
McNally and Gray were charged with federal mail fraud through a scheme
devised to deprive the people of Kentucky of their right to honest government
-63services.
McNall y and Gray were convicted by a jury in the Eastern District of
Kentucky and appealed to the Sixth Circuit, complaining that a scheme to
"defraud the citizens of their intangible rights to honest and irmrartial
government" was outside the reach of the federal mail fraud statute.6 The
Sixth Circuit, however, upheld the convictions, relying on the conclusions of
several other circuits that intangible rights were within the scope of the
statute.66 The Supreme Court reversed, indicating that, although it was clear
59. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 353 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
60. Id. at 352-53, 355.
61. Id. at 352. Hunt and Grey recognized this bribe as an opportunity for personal gain. See
id. at 353 (discussing the funneling of these commissions to Seton Investments, Inc.-a company
created for the sole purpose of distributing Wombwell commissions to both Hunt and Gray).
62. Id at 352-53.
63. Id at 353-54 (basing the charges on mailed commission checks from Wombwell to the
investment company that the men controlled).
64. Id at 355. In a separate case, Hunt pled guilty to mail and tax fraud and was sentenced
to three years in prison. Id at 353.
65. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1292, 1294-95 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). The concept of public entitlement to an
intangible right to honest services derives from a theory that the fiduciary duty running from
government officials to their constituency is breached when they participate in activities outside
the state's best interests. See id at 1294; see also PODGOR & ISRAEL, supra note 18, at 63
(stating that, during the 1980s, "mail fraud was not limited to cases where a victim suffered
monetary or property loss but included breaches of an owed fiduciary duty").
66. See Gray, 790 F.2d at 1294-95 (citing United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964
(7th Cir. 1984), overruled by United States v. Ginsberg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985)); United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1364 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388,
1400 (2d Cir. 1976)). Since the 1940s, prosecutors have been able to successfully convict corrupt
government officials of mail fraud on the theory that the corruption deprived citizens of their right
to honest services. See United States v. Margiotaa, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing the
basic principle that "a public official may be prosecuted under [the mail fraud statute] when his
alleged scheme to defraud has as its sole object the deprivation of intangible and abstract political
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that the mail fraud statute protected property rights, it doubted that Congress
intended that the statute's protection be extended to intangible rights.6 7
Although the added Durland language seemed disjunctive to the existing
"scheme to defraud" language, the McNally Court felt that the 1909
amendment indicated Congress's intent to limit the existing "scheme to
defraud" language to money or property rights. The Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend to disrupt the common understanding of the term "to
defraud," which meant "'wronging one in his property rights by dishonest
methods or schemes,' and 'usually signifies] the deprivation of something of
value . .. .- 69 The Court also provided insight into why some courts had been
so hesitant to apply such a broad reach of the mail fraud statute.7 0  In
conclusion, the Court proclaimed that Congress should speak more clearly if it
intended for the statute to have a broader scope. Congress reacted almost
immediately: hardly one year after McNally, Congress amended the mail fraud
and civil rights of the general citizenry"); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir.
1976) (noting that "a public official may be prosecuted under [the mail fraud statute] if he devises
a scheme whereby bribes or kickbacks are accepted in the course of conduct of his office, since
such conduct operates to defraud the citizens of his government of their right to his honest and
faithful services"); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1941) (emphasizing that
"[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain an advantage
by corrupting such an one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud"), overruled
by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973).
67. McNally, 483 U.S. at 356 ("Insofar as the sparse legislative history reveals anything, it
indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect the people from
schemes to deprive them of their money or property." (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court
reasoned that without any indication the resulting insurance premiums had been inflated outside
of what the state would have paid in absence of the scheme, the state was not deprived of money
or property, and, therefore, a conviction under the statute could not be sustained. Id. at 360.
68. See id. at 358 (discussing how use of the word "or" between the terms "scheme to
defraud" and "for obtaining" makes the statute appear disjunctive in nature and may explain why
the lower courts have read the terms independently). But see id. at 359 ("As we see it, adding the
second phrase simply made it unmistakable that the statute reached false promises and
misrepresentations as to the future as well as other frauds involving money or property.").
69. Id. at 358 (citing Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)) (emphasis
added). The Court noted that Hammerschmidt found this definition to include protection against
interference with citizens' rights to government services, but distinguished that assertion as
relevant only to Hammerschmidt's consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which was not at issue in
McNally. Id. at 358-59, 358 n.8. The Supreme Court also considered the textual contents of the
definition relating to "something of value" to conclude that Congress was not trying to expand the
term "to defraud" in its codification of the Durland holding, but was instead limiting the term to
tangible money or property. Id. at 358-59.
70. See id. at 359-60 (explaining that a well-established principle mandates that courts
should avoid interpreting criminal statutes in broad a manner that would permit the punishment of
crimes not clearly intended to be within the statute's scope).
71. Id. at 360.
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statute to explicitly provide for the protection of "intangible rights of honest
services" under the statute.72
B. Twenty Years of Conflicting Decisions Regarding the Impact ofIndirect
Misrepresentations to Victims ofMail Fraud Schemes
1. Strict Textual Interpretations Resulting in Narrowing Limitations
Within the past twenty-three years, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have required the government to establish that a direct misrepresentation was
made to the intended victim of a scheme to defraud to sustain a conviction for
mail or wire fraud.73 These courts based their holdings on the Supreme
Court's ruling in McNally and the strict textual interpretation of the definition
74of the term "to defraud" used in that case.
The Second Circuit relied on McNally's strict textual interpretation in United
States v. Evans.75  Samuel Evans participated in a conspiracy with Adnan
Khashoggito, an infamous Saudi arms dealer, to illegally sell U.S.-made arms
worth more than $2 billion to Iran.76 Evans was charged with fifty-five counts
of federal mail fraud.77 The government alleged that Evans devised a scheme
to defraud the U.S. government of money and property by mailing false
end-user documents, which reported that the arms sales had been made to a
permissible entity.78  Judge Leonard Sand of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the federal mail and wire fraud
charges against Evans.79 Agreeing with Evans's defense, Judge Sand reasoned
that "McNally requires . . . that the victim of the deception . . . lose money or
property ... [and] although [the federal government was] deceived [it] lost no
money or property."80
72. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
73. See infra notes 76-102 and accompanying text (outlining the Second Circuit's decision
in United States v. Evans, the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Lew, and the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in United States v. Bailey, and illustrating the reliance of each circuit on a strict
textual interpretation of the language used in McNally v. United States).
74. Infra notes 76-102 and accompanying text.
75. United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1988).
76. Id. at 37.
77. Id The government charged Evans with multiple counts under a theory affirmed by the
Supreme Court that "[e]ach letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate and distinct
violation of the [mail fraud] act." Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 315 (1896) (quoting In
re Henry, 123 U.S. 372, 374 (1887)). For further explanation of this theory, see Low &
HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 168 (noting that there is "no substantive limit on the number of
offenses that could be spun out of a single scheme to defraud" based on violations for each
separate mailing).
78. Evans, 844 F.2d at 37.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 38 (summarizing Evans's argument that because the weapons were legitimately
paid for and provided by manufacturers, and the commissions earned on the illegal sales would be
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The government appealed to the Second Circuit.8 ' Defending Judge Sand's
decision, the defendant urged the Second Circuit to adopt McNally as directly
representing the notion that there can be no mail or wire fraud in the absence of
deprivation to the deceived party.82 The Second Circuit pointed out that
McNally established the type of rights that are protected by the statute but did
not decide whether the defrauded party's property must be taken for the statute
to apply.83 Despite this acknowledgment, the court went on to find that the
specific language used in McNally's rationale, such as "deprive them" and
"wronging one in his property rights," suggested that the Supreme Court may
have interpreted the statute to read the way the defendant argued.84 However,
the Second Circuit stopped short of upholding the district court's rationale for
85dismissal. Instead, the court held that because the U.S. government was not
deprived of any "tangible" property rights, as required by McNally, the court
did not have to address "whether the person deceived also had to lose money
or property." 86
The Ninth Circuit boldly went one step further than the Second Circuit and
extended the limitations of McNally to require a direct misrepresentation to the
intended victim of a scheme to defraud to sustain a conviction for mail fraud.87
Bill Lew, an immigration attorney, effectuated a scheme in which he made
fraudulent statements to the Department of Labor (DOL) to obtain employment
certifications for his clients, thereby entitling them to qualify for
permanent-resident status with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)." The government charged Lew with mail fraud," alleging in the
indictment that Lew devised a scheme to defraud his clients of money by
making false representations of his ability to help them obtain lawful
paid by foreign governments, ultimately the United States-the party deceived-was not
deprived of any money or property).
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 39.
83. Id (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987)) (noting that McNally
found the scope of the mail fraud statute limited to the protection of property rights).
84. Id
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id. at 39-40.
87. United States v. Lew, 875 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1989); see also infra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text (stating the Ninth Circuit's holding in Lew).
88. Lew, 875 F.2d 220 at 220. The DOL issues employment certifications to alien workers
after the employer demonstrates the inability to fill the open position with a United States citizen.
Id The employer may then file a form requesting permanent resident status for the alien through
the INS. Id. Lew's associate, Joshua Chang, used his existing companies or established new
companies as a fictitious employer to claim the employer needs that allowed him to file
permanent resident requests. Id Chang was also indicted for mail fraud but was given leniency
in return for his testimony against Lew. Id. at 221.
89. Id at 220. Lew was charged with six counts of federal mail fraud in which he
knowingly mailed fraudulent applications for alien-employment certificates to the DOL. Id.
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permanent residency. 90 A jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California convicted Lew of six counts of mail fraud based on
falsified employment-certification applications mailed to the INS in
furtherance of this scheme.91
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit faced the issue whether McNally required the
judge to instruct the jury that it could convict only if it found "that Lew
[directly] deceived his clients."92 Lew argued that McNally required money or
property be obtained as a direct result of the fraudulent statements.93 The
government, on the other hand, contended that under McNally, the mail fraud
statute applied whenever the primary intent of the scheme was to obtain money
or property, even if this money was obtained from entities to whom
misrepresentations had not been made.94 The court considered McNally's
specific textual breakdown of the term "to defraud,"95 and concluded that the
Supreme Court in McNally had expanded the intent element of the mail fraud
statute to require "the intent ... to obtain money or propertyfrom the one who
is deceived."9 6 Finding that the record lacked any indication that Lew made
direct misrepresentations to his clients, the Ninth Circuit reversed Lew's mail
fraud convictions.97
The Eleventh Circuit also weighed in on the issue of who must be defrauded
in United States v. Bailey.98  The government charged Thomas Bailey with
mail fraud for his scheme to defraud Heckler and Koch (H&K), a German
firearms manufacturer, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of money and
property by ordering firearms in excess of law-enforcement needs with the
intention of selling them to civilians at an inflated price.99 He was convicted
on ten counts of mail fraud.100 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Bailey
argued his convictions for mail fraud could not be sustained under McNally
and Lew because the evidence did not sufficiently prove that he deprived the
intended victims of any money or property. 01 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
90. Id. at 221.
91. Id at 220.
92. Id at 221.
93. Id
94. Id
95. See id (relying on the textual structure of the Supreme Court's definition of "the words
'to defraud' [which] commonly refer 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest
methods of schemes' (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 221, 222.
98. See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1390 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing Thomas
Bailey's appeal on the issue of misrepresentation).
99. See id. at 1386-88. Bailey possessed a federal firearms license with special authority to
sell firearms to law enforcement, which provided him the ability to negotiate a contract price for
weapons absent the federal excise tax. Id. at 1384-85.
100. Id. at 1390.
101. Id. at 1390 & 1390 n.12.
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did find that Bailey had, in fact, make direct misrepresentations to the intended
victims of his scheme, thus avoiding having to determine whether direct
misrepresentation is an essential element to a mail fraud charge, but not before
accepting the standard laid out in Lew requiring evidence of a direct
misrepresentation as correct.'02
2. Liberal Interpretations: General Intent to Prevent Fraud
Within the same time period in which the circuit courts decided Evans, Lew,
and Bailey, the Third, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits concluded that neither the mail
fraud statute nor McNally require a direct misrepresentation to be made to the
intended victim of a scheme to defraud to sustain a conviction for mail or wire
fraud.103  Each court based its reasoning on the concept of reviewing the
totality of the alleged scheme for a general intent to defraud.104
The Third Circuit first considered a general intent to defraud approach in
United States v. Olatunji.0 5 Koya Olatunji, a Nigerian citizen, devised a
scheme that would enable him to obtain money in the form of student loans
from the United States Department of Education (DOE). 06 Olatunji married
an American citizen, Sonja Woods, to qualify for a green card, thereby making
him eligible for student loans as an American citizen.' 07  The government
charged Olatunji with mail fraud, alleging that he defrauded the DOE of
student loan funds by making misrepresentations to the INS on a mailed
application for permanent residency.' The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania relied on Third Circuit precedent and dismissed the
charges against Olatunji because of insufficient evidence pointing to any direct
misrepresentation to the DOE.109  On appeal to the Third Circuit, the
102. See id. at 1390 n.12 (finding direct misrepresentations were made to both H&K and the
IRS, the intended victims of the defendant's scheme, thus satisfying the standard announced in
Lew). Bailey defrauded H&K by misrepresenting orders to be subject to tax exemption. Id at
1385, 1385 & n.5. Additionally, Bailey defrauded the IRS in its ability to collect the taxes on
weapons sold to civilians. Id at 1390 n.12.
103. See infra notes 106-133 and accompanying text (outlining the Third Circuit's decision
in United States v. Olatunji, the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Blumeyer, and the
Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. McMillan, and discussing those courts' consideration
of the totality of the circumstances in finding a general intent to defraud).
104. Infra notes 106-133 and accompanying text.
105. United States v. Olatunji (Olatunji ll), 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3d Cir. 1989).
106. Id. at 1163-64.
107. Id.atll62.
108. United States v. Olatunji (Olatunji 1), No. 88-338-01, 1988 WL 117950, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 1, 1988).
109. Id The alleged scheme was one to defraud the DOE of student loan money, but
Olatunji was in possession of a valid green card and therefore made no direct misrepresentations
to the DOE in his student loan application. Olatunji ll, 872 F.2d at 1163. The district court relied
on United States v. Frankel. Olatunji I, 1988 WL 117950, at * I ("[A]n indictment that charges a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 on the ground[s] .. . of false or fraudulent pretenses (as opposed to
only charging a scheme to defraud) must specifically set forth statements which constitute
794 [Vol. 60:779
2011] Semantics and Misrepresentation in Mail and Wire Fraud
government argued that the district court erred in requiring a direct
misrepresentation to the intended victim of a scheme to defraud. 110 The
government argued that Olatunji's purpose in making misrepresentations to the
INS was to obtain student loan money."' The Third Circuit reinstated the mail
fraud charges on the basis that Olatunji's misrepresentations to the INS were
directly related to his eligibility for student loans.112 The court reasoned that
"deceitful statements of half-truths or the concealment of material facts" were
enough to establish fraud, and that Olatunji's concealment of his material
misrepresentation to the INS made him eligible for student loans.113 The court
went on to question the logic in dismissing charges of an alleged scheme under
"an overly narrow reading of [the statute]" merely because the scheme was
sophisticated. 14
The Eiphth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v.
Blumeyer. 15 Insurance companies operating in Missouri are required to obtain
a valid certificate from the Missouri Department of Insurance (MDI)." With
the purpose of acquiring "a Certificate of Authority to sell property and
casualty insurance," Arthur Blumeyer participated in questionable financial
maneuvers to portray his company's ability to meet MDI requirements.'
Blumeyer was indicted for mailing fraudulent financial statements to the MDI
in a scheme to defraud existing and potential clients of insurance premiums he
kept for personal use.' He was convicted of mail and wire fraud in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.119
misrepresentations." (citing United States v. Frankel, 721 F.2d 917, 919 (3d Cir. 1983)). In
Frankel, the Third Circuit interpreted the 1909 amended language of the mail fraud statute to
include false pretenses as a means of executing the intended scheme, not an element of the crime
itself, therefore requiring proof only where the use of false pretenses is alleged. See Frankel, 721
F.2d at 918-20 (discussing why the "scheme to defraud" language and "for obtaining money or
property" language of the mail and wire fraud statutes should be read independently).
110. Olatunji II, 872 F.2d at 1162-63.
Ill. Id.atll62.
112. Id. at 1167-68.
113. Id. at 1167 (quoting United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 410 (10th Cir. 1977)).
114. Id at 1167-68 ("Olatunji should not be shielded from criminal liability under an overly
narrow reading of section 1341 simply because the scheme he allegedly created is an elaborate
one.").
115. United States v. Blumeyer, 114 F.3d 758, 767-68 (8th Cir. 1997).
116. Id. at 762. The MDI is tasked with assessing the financial position of any potential
insurance start-ups to ensure the company's ability to properly remit payment for the insured
services. Id.
117. Id at 762-63.
118. See id. at 761-64. Once the Certificate was fraudulently obtained, the defendant
continued to shield the true nature of his companies' liabilities while transferring assets to
personal offshore bank accounts. Id. at 763. When the state discovered the fraud, it revoked
Blumeyer's Certificate, liquidated his companies, and discovered there was only "$2 million in
assets with which to pay claims totaling more than $90 million." Id. at 764.
119. Id. at 764.
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On appeal in the Eighth Circuit, Blumeyer complained of insufficient
evidence to show a direct misrepresentation to the intended victims of the
scheme to defraud.12 0 However, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Blumeyer's mail
and wire fraud convictions on the basis of circumstantial evidence in the record
that supported a showing that at least one broker may have directly relied on
financial statements filed with the MDI.121 In recognizing no clear precedent
regarding "[wihether a defendant may be convicted of mail fraud or wire fraud
for making false representations only to persons other than the intended
victims of the scheme," the court abstained from deciding the issue, but not
before contributing its opinion.122 The court found that analyzing a scheme in
its entirety was a more logical approach in delineating a defendant's intended
purpose to defraud.123 Following this approach, the Eighth Circuit viewed the
defendant's misrepresentation to the MDI as clear evidence of a broader
scheme to defraud others. 124
United States v. McMillan presented the Fifth Circuit with facts similar to
those in Blumeyer.125 In an attempt to obtain a Louisiana state license to
operate a health maintenance organization (HMO), Robert McMillan
participated in questionable financial maneuvers to prove his company's ability
to meet Louisiana's net-worth requirements.126 In addition, he kept the
collected premiums as management fees instead of paying for the rendered
medical services.127 McMillan was indicted for mail and wire fraud for
indirectly defrauding HMO subscribers and providers by falsely reporting
financial claims to the Louisiana Department of Insurance,128 and he was
120. See id. at 767 (discussing that the intended victims of the scheme were insurance
brokers and policyholders with no direct access to Blumeyer's financial claims).
121. Id at 768 (noting that the financial records filed with the MDI were public documents
that could be obtained by the general public at any time, and the facts indicated that the records
were released to at least one broker).
122. See id at 767-68 (laying out the disagreement between the circuits on the issue of
misrepresentation and suggesting that analyzing the scheme as a whole was the more logical
approach over requiring direct misrepresentation).
123. See id.
124. See id. ("We believe that the Seventh Circuit has the better argument: a defendant who
makes false representations to a regulatory agency in order to forestall regulatory action that
threatens to impede the defendant's scheme to obtain money or property from others is guilty of
conducting a scheme [to defraud] . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125. Compare United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 441-42, 447 (5th Cir. 2010)
(explaining McMillan's participation in an extremely similar scheme in which McMillan made
misrepresentations to an insurance agency in order to defraud current and potential customers),
with Olatunji II, 872 F.2d at 1162-63, at 762-63 (describing Blumeyer's scheme and third-party
reliance on misrepresentations made to a regulatory agency).
126. McMillan, 600 F.3d at 441-42, 447.
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convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.129
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendants argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support a showing of direct misrepresentation to the defrauded
parties. 130 They claimed that their argument was supported by Cleveland v.
United States, a case in which the Supreme Court concluded that, "for
purposes of the mail fraud statute, the thing obtained must be property in the
hands of the victim."' 31 They also relied on United States v. Ratcliff a case in
which the Fifth Circuit found "no basis to find a scheme to defraud" if the
intended victim was not deprived of any money or property.132 The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged the precedent, but distinguished the cases because they
were concerned with property rights and should not be read so literally as to be
applied to the question of whose property must be taken.133  The court
concluded that requiring direct misrepresentation to the intended victim of a
scheme to defraud under Ratcliff would be "contrary to [that court's
recognition that misrepresentations need not be made directly to the victim."l 3
The Fifth Circuit found the indirect misrepresentations sufficient to sustain
McMillan's conviction. 135  The court's conclusion emphasized that the
sufficiency of a misrepresentation to sustain a conviction for mail fraud should
be determined by whether the misrepresentation affected the victim's property
rights.136 In reviewing the pertinent scheme as a whole, the court found clear
evidence that "the victims' property rights were affected by the
129. See id
130. Id. at 447 (discussing McMillan's argument that because his misrepresentations were
not made to the victims of the scheme, he could not be convicted of mail and wire fraud).
131. Id. at 448 (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 (2000)). In Cleveland,
the Supreme Court dismissed charges of mail fraud against Cleveland and others, who allegedly
misrepresented facts to the Louisiana state police on an application for a video-poker license,
because deprivation of something with questionable future value constituted insufficient money
or property under the mail fraud statute. Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 15.
132. McMillan, 600 F.3d at 448 (quoting United States v. Ratcliff, 488 F.3d 639, 645
(2007)). In Ratclff the Livingston Parish President was charged with mail fraud for improperly
concealing campaign contributions from Louisiana's Board of Ethics in an attempt to secure his
re-election. Ratclift 488 F.3d at 691-92. However, the Fifth Circuit overruled the indictment
and found that the President misrepresented facts to the Board of Ethics and the voters, but that
these victims were not deprived of any money or property. Id at 695.
133. McMillan, 600 F.3d at 448-49. The question in Cleveland was whether a business
license could be considered "property" under the mail fraud statute; the Supreme Court found the
license to be an intangible regulatory interest, but not "property" protected under the mail fraud
statute. Id at 448. In Ratcliff the question of whether the Parish was directly deceived was
considered only to determine whether the Parish lost money or property when the salary and
benefits would have been paid regardless of the misrepresentations; the court found that it was
not. Id. at 448-49.
134. Id. at 449.
135. Id. at 449-50.
136. Id. at 449 ("The issue is whether the victims' property rights were affected by the
misrepresentations. We think they were.").
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misrepresentations" made by the defendants, and affirmed the lower court's
convictions. 137
II. WHO Is RIGHT? ONE LAST CHANCE FOR BRIAN NEWMARK
Brian Newmark owned and operated an investment-brokerage company.'38
Barry Bohmueller was an attorney who maintained a wills, trusts, and estates
law practice. 39  Newmark conducted marketing campaigns advertising
Bohmueller's services, and then Newmark's business acted as a notary and
courier in the execution of the prepared estate documents.140  Arthur and
Thomas Walker were retired brothers in their mid-eighties who had amassed
great wealth as successful entrepreneurs.14 1  After successfully marketing
Bohmueller's services to the Walker brothers in person at their home, a
Newmark agent hand delivered the paperwork and acted as the notary durin
the execution of the various estate documents the Walkers had drafted.14
Upon a second visit to the Walkers' home, Newmark's agent successfully sold
the Walkers an alternate investment tool in the form of charitable-gift
annuities.143 After Newmark's verbal efforts to initiate the transfer of the
Walkers' funds from a brokerage account at Morgan Stanley failed, he wrote a
demand letter for the transfer of funds, which he faxed to a Morgan Stanley
compliance analyst using a Bohmueller Law Offices fax coversheet. 144 Upon
receipt of the fax, Morgan Stanley transferred the funds to the Newmark
annuity.145 Although the annuity performed as promised, the brothers brought
a civil suit against Newmark, arguing that the investment was inadequate; they
137. Id at 449-50.
138. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at 7.
139. Id
140. Id. Newmark then targeted Bohmueller's clients and tried to sell them insurance and
financial products. Id.
141. Id. at 7-8. The brothers' assets were valued in excess of $3.5 million, including a
securities account managed by Morgan Stanley. United States v. Newmark, 374 Fed. App'x 279,
280-81 (3d Cir. 2010).
142. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at 8. The Walkers and their neighbors
who witnessed the execution of the estate documents all testified that they believed the Newmark
agent to be an attorney. Id The Newmark agent even provided his contact information on the
back of a Bohmueller Law Office business card. Id. at 9 n.5.
143. Id. at 8. Morgan Stanley previously managed the Walker's securities, and either
because it recognized the inadequacy of the investment or because it was hesitant to lose the
business, Morgan Stanley dragged its feet for more than a month in the transfer of securities to
the new account while it tried to convince the Walker brothers of their mistake. Id. at 9-10.
144. Id at 10-11. The content of the fax suggested that Newmark represented the brothers in
a legal capacity. Id He did not go as far as identifying himself as an attorney, but he specifically
referred to the Walkers as his "clients" and attached a letter, signed by the Walkers, referencing
"our attorney's office." Id. Newmark also changed the phone and fax number on the
Bohmueller's letterhead to that of his own separate office. Id. at 10.
145. Id. at I1.
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eventually settled for a refund of the purchase price less the annuity payments
already received. 146
Federal prosecutors charged Newmark with wire fraud, alleging that his
"otherwise" legal interstate fax transmission to Morgan Stanley demanding the
transfer of funds was done in furtherance of a scheme to defraud Arthur and
Thomas Walker of their securities.147 The alleged scheme was that Newmark
intended to gain the Walkers' trust by misrepresenting himself as a lawyer to
defraud them of $230,000 in commission.148  A jury in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania convicted Newmark on
three counts of the indictment, after which the court granted a post-trial motion
for acquittal on two counts, leaving conviction for one count of wire fraud. 149
On appeal in the Third Circuit, Newmark argued that a showing of
misrepresentation made to Morgan Stanley was insufficient to establish that he
devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the Walkers.150 Newmark relied
on precedent from other circuits requiring direct misrepresentations be made to
the intended victim of a scheme to sustain a wire fraud conviction.151 Relying
on its own precedent, however, the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction and
held that indirect misrepresentations were circumstantial evidence sufficient to
prove the existence of a scheme to defraud.152
146. Id. at 11-12. This was not the first time the Walkers questioned the adequacy of this
financial product; upon discovering that the Walkers were attempting to transfer their securities
account, Morgan Stanley sent an investment adviser to their home whereupon the Walkers
cancelled their initial purchase. Id at 9-10. However, the next day Newmark's agent again
convinced the brothers to proceed with the transaction. Id. at 10. The investment performed as
promised and delivered each brother a monthly payment of about $13,000. Id. at 11. However,
within eighteen months of the purchase, the brothers changed their minds again and brought suit
against Newmark. Id.
147. Id at 4-5, 10.
148. Id. at 6, 11 ("From [the sale of this annuity, Newmark] earned a commission of
$230,408, out of which he paid [his agent] a commission of $69,740.").
149. Id. at 5.
150. United States v. Newmark, 374 F. App'x 279, 282 & n.l (3d Cir. 2010). The "victim"
of his misrepresentation was Morgan Stanley, not Arthur and Thomas Walker, and because the
alleged scheme was one to defraud the Walkers, the deceived party was not deprived of any
money or property. Id Additionally, in his petition for a writ of certiorari, Newmark claimed
that this fax could not have been sent in furtherance of a scheme to gain the Walkers' trust
because the fax was made absent the Walkers' knowledge and after they already agreed to the
transaction. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at 4.
151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at 14. In reversing a mail fraud conviction
in United States v. Lew, the Ninth Circuit required that money or property be received from the
"one who is deceived." See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. In United States v.
Bailey, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lew as correct. See supra
note 98 and accompanying text. In United States v. Evans, the Second Circuit discussed the
possibility that Congress may have intended for the mail fraud statute to require direct
misrepresentation to the intended victim of a scheme to defraud. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
152. Newmark, 374 F. App'x at 282 (citing Olatunji H1, 872 F.2d 1161, 1168). In Olatunji ll,
the Third Circuit questioned the logic of dismissing charges of an alleged scheme under "an
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Newmark argued to the Supreme Court that the Third Circuit erred in
upholding a conviction for mail or wire fraud without direct misrepresentation
to the intended victim of the scheme to defraud.' 53 Newmark argued that the
rule established in the Second and Ninth Circuits requiring direct
misrepresentation to the deceived party was "more logical and better tied to the
statutory text," and more in line with the Supreme Court's prior decision in
McNally.154
IlI. SOLIDIFYING THE PROSECUTORIAL POWER TO PUNISH SOPHISTICATED
FRAUDS
In his dissenting opinion in McNally, Justice John Paul Stevens stated: "In
considering the scope of the mail fraud statute it is essential to remember
Congress' [sic] purpose in enacting it. Congress sought to protect the integrity
of the United States mails by not allowing them to be used as 'instruments of
crime."'as Although Newmark correctly identified the need for further
clarification in the lower courts regarding the extent of misrepresentations
required to sustain a conviction for mail or wire fraud, he incorrectly identified
the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' standards as logical because those
courts failed to consider the statute's broad reaching purpose of preventing the
use of the mails for fraudulent activity. 156
A. The ProofIs in the Pudding: Establishing Congress's Intent Absent Any
Direct Legislative History
Unfortunately, there is very little legislative history discussing the
congressional purpose or intended reach of the mail fraud statute.'5 7  Absent
documented legislative history, those interpreting the statute can rely only on
overly narrow reading of [the statute]" merely because the scheme was sophisticated. See
Olatunji H, 872 F.2dat 1168.
153. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at 18. There is an inherent unfairness
in the disagreement between the jurisdictions as to what constitutes mail fraud and the effect this
has on defendants who must defend a tougher standard in one jurisdiction over another. See
Behrens, supra note 11, at 525.
154. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at 14-16 (indicating the Second,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in McNally).
155. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 365 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1975)), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
156. See supra Part 1.B.1 (discussing the Second and Ninth Circuits' strict textual
interpretation of the definition of the term "to defraud" used in McNally to require a direct
misrepresentation be made to the intended victim of a scheme to defraud).
157. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 779 ("[The mail fraud statute] generated no congressional
debate or other legislative history explaining its origins and purpose."); see also Beale, supra note
13 ("[The mail fraud statute] evoked almost no discussion in Congress, so there is little legislative
history to provide guidance to the courts.").
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three sources to try to delineate congressional intent: (1) the historical context
in which the statute was written; (2) the language of the statute itself; and (3)
Congress's reaction to judicial treatment of the statute.
1. Historical Context
The years immediately following the Civil War comprised a period of
significant economic growth for the country that was met with a convergence
of interstate frauds and swindles that sparked a public outcry.15 Many
statutes, including "the Sherman Act [of 1890], the civil rights legislation [of
1866], and the mail fraud statute [of 1872] were written in broad general
language on the understanding that the courts would have wide latitude in
construing them to achieve the remedial purposes that Congress had
identified."' 59 The fast-paced ingenuity in devising new fraud schemes offers
one explanation for the ambiguity in the language of the mail fraud statute and
indicates that Congress wanted to give prosecutors flexibility to keep pace with
inventive swindlers.160
2. Language of the Statute
At the time the mail fraud statute was drafted, however, it was unclear how
much constitutional power Congress had to extend its authority over criminal
provisions traditionally left to the states.161 Congress may have relied on
specific language linking use of the mails for illicit purposes to the offense in
the original mail fraud statute to ensure that the statute was constitutional. 16 It
158. BIEGELMAN, supra note 32, at 1.
159. McNally, 483 U.S. at 372-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 771 (stating that the flexibility in the mail fraud statute is
still important 138 years after the Civil War).
161. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 781 (stating that although some doubted even the states'
power to regulate what was placed in the mails, it was widely accepted that Congress lacked the
power to regulate what was in the mails). Additionally, "[1]ess than two percent of the criminal
prosecutions brought in the United States are in the federal system." PODGOR & ISRAEL, supra
note 18, at 6. It is now well accepted that some mail fraud that is perpetrated locally may still be
prosecuted federally because of Congress's postal powers. See id at 4-7 (discussing Congress's
statutory basis for prosecuting criminal conduct that violates both federal and state codes).
Additionally, "the several courts that have been called upon to decide the question are uniformly
of the opinion that the fact that a scheme to defraud may or may not violate state law does not
determine whether the scheme is within the proscription of the mail fraud statute." United States
v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245,
1247 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 544 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 880
(5th Cir. 1972)).
162. The statute linked the mail fraud offense to the mails in four places: (1) the scheme to
defraud "must be . . . effected by opening mail communication" with another person; (2) "a letter
or packet must be mailed"; (3) the misdemeanor offense is based on use of the mails; and (4) the
punishment is proportioned to the extent the mails are used in furtherance of the scheme. See
Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 163.
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appears that Congress intended the "mail-emphasizing" language in the
original mail fraud statute to be nothing more than a jurisdictional hook linking
congressional power to regulate the postal system with the statute's power to
prevent frauds.163 However, some courts relied on a strict textual interpretation
of the statute, which "required that the mail be central to the perpetration of the
fraud and limited the kinds of schemes to which the statute applied."1 6 4
The 1889 amendment elaborated on the types of schemes and places of the
mailings covered under the statute.165 Some courts viewed the congressional
action as vindication for limiting the reach of the statute, interpreting the
amendment to be indicative of Congress's intent that the statute not reach
beyond the types of schemes specified in the language.166 However, the
amendment embraced the broad holding of United States v. Jones, in which the
court found a counterfeiting scheme within the scope of the statute
notwithstanding the possibility of successful application of the scheme without
use of the mails.167
The Supreme Court finally entered the fray with its 1896 decision in
Durland v. United States and found "[t]he [mail fraud] statute [to be] broader
than is claimed." 68 The Court looked "beyond the letter of the statute" to find
that it "include[d] everything designed to defraud by representations as to the
past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future."l69 The Court
went on the say that "[i]t was with the purpose of protecting the public against
all such intentional efforts to despoil . . . that this statute was passed; and it
would strip it of value to confine it to such cases as disclose on actual
misrepresentation as to some existing fact."170  Congress then decided to
amend the mail fraud statute more dramatically based on the Court's strict
textual interpretations, which were thwarting the effectiveness of the statute.' 7 1
The 1909 amendment eliminated a majority of the "mail-emphasizing"
language and specifically codified the broad language used in the Durland
172decision.
163. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 781 ("The mere fact that Congress was forbidden to employ
such means as opening sealed letters did not mean that Congress lacked the power to prosecute
those who were discovered, through legitimate means of detection, to have used the federal mails
for illicit purposes."); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
establish Post Offices and Post Roads . . . .").
164. Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 168; see also supra note 37.
165. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
166. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
168. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 314.
171. Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 172-73.
172. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Durland holding and the
codification of the specific language used in that decision).
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The history tracing the language of the statute indicates that Congress
intended a broad application in its initial codification of the mail fraud
statute.' 73  In addition to the evolution of the statutes' language, Congress's
modem intent can be shown through its frequent amendments to emphasize a
broad interpretation in response to each judicial attempt to limit the language's
application. 174
3. Congressional Action and Reaction
In McNally, Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, reasoned that "[t]he general
language in the mail fraud statute has repeatedly been construed to cover novel
species of fraud, and Congress has repeatedly amended the statute in ways that
support a broad interpretation of its basic thrust."s7 5 This reaction began only
seventeen years after the enactment of the original mail fraud statute;
seemingly in response to the Supreme Court's silence regarding the dispute
between the lower courts surrounding the type of frauds to which the mail
fraud statute should apply, Congress expanded the statute to include a list of
specific schemes in 1889.176 However, the narrowing nature of an enumerated
list of schemes fueled the debate between the courts. 7
The broad-sweeping language used by the Supreme Court in Durland should
have been enough to settle the disagreements between the lower courts
regarding the scope of the statute. However, some courts read Durland as
applicable only to the types of fraud to which the statute should be applied.1 79
If Congress intended the broad Durland language to apply only to the "scheme
to defraud" language in the statute, it need not have acted because the Durland
173. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text (illustrating how Congress repeatedly
amended the statute in response to court holdings that limited the application of the statute
through strict interpretation of the language).
174. See supra note 16.
175. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 374 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat.
4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
176. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (describing the disagreement between the
lower courts and Congress's reaction through an amended statute). Although there was some
question among the courts as to whether this amended language could shed any light on
Congress's initial intent in enacting the 1872 version of the statute, it was clear that the 1889
statute generally prohibited a scheme to defraud along with the additional list of schemes and
therefore expanded the statute's reach. See Culp v. United States, 82 F. 990, 991 (3d Cir. 1897)
("[T]he purpose of the [l 889] amendment was not to restrict, but to extend, the operation of the
statute.").
177. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing the exploitation of the
statute's new language by both broad and strict constructionists).
178. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 811-12 (suggesting that, in Durland, the Supreme Court
nearly affirmed the broad constructionists' application of the mail fraud statute).
179. See supra note 38.
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decision was clear on that point.o Thirteen years after Durland was handed
down, however, Congress acted again by amending the mail fraud statute in a
way that applied the broad-reaching language to the entire scope of the
statute. 81
Almost one hundred years after Durland, the Supreme Court again tried to
limit the statute's reach to tangible property rights in McNally. 182The McNally
Court expressed concern with the ambiguity in the language of the statute
because it provided prosecutors with the power to decide when and to whom
the statute applied. However, Congress quickly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to
overrule McNally.184
Congress's continual acquiescence to liberal interpretation and application
of the statute and its action in amending the statute to further generalize its
language in response to narrow interpretations of the statute make clear that
Congress intends the mail and wire fraud statutes to be applied liberally in both
reach and scope.
B. Interpreting McNally Too Literally: Defining the Term "To Defraud"
By requiring a showing of a direct misrepresentation to the intended victim
of a scheme to defraud, the Second and Ninth Circuits relied on the specific
definition of the term "defraud" used by the Supreme Court in McNally.' In
Lew, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the government's attempts to keep McNally
within a box concerning merely the substance of the property rights at issue
and, instead, read the McNally language defining "fraud" to add a layer of
180. See supra note 44 (demonstrating that although Durland employed broad language that
encompassed the broad constructionist views, its more narrow holding did not directly address the
entire scope of the mail fraud statute).
181. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's assessment
that it had not been Congress's intent to extend the reach of the mail fraud statute to intangible
property rights).
183. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
184. See Low & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 198 ("[W]ith one stroke of the congressional
pen, McNally was overruled.").
185. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing the steps the Second Circuit
took in breaking down the textual definition of "defraud" used in McNally); see also supra notes
89-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's understanding and application of
McNally regarding the intent requirement under the mail fraud statute). The Eleventh Circuit
never analyzed the issue of whether a showing of direct misrepresentation must be made to
sustain a conviction for mail fraud but accepted the standard laid out by the Ninth Circuit as
correct. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Although McNally did define the term
"to defraud," it did so only to prove Congress's intent that the term be limited to money or
property. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 357-59 (providing the definition of the term "to defraud,"
offered by the Supreme Court in Hammerscmidt v. United States, as explicit evidence that the
mail fraud statute be applied to only money and property rights).
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evidentiary proof required to establish a mail fraud violation.186 But nowhere
in McNally did the Supreme Court characterize its analysis as requiring an
additional element.187  To the contrary, the Supreme Court recognized the
statute's intent to protect those against frauds in its broadest sense when money
or property is involved.188  In Evans, the Second Circuit also relied on
McNally's textual analysis of the term "to defraud" as support for its
discussion regarding the misrepresentation issue.189 The Evans court also
failed to consider the totality of McNally's analysis because it narrowly
focused on the specific language of the "fraud" definition.190
Holdings that rely on such a specific definition of the term "defraud"
incorrectly limit the mail and wire fraud statutes' broader intent. 19' It is
counterintuitive to rely on Supreme Court dictum, which was overruled by
congressional action because it was too narrow, and then narrowly construe
that same term to require proof of a direct misrepresentation to the intended
victim of a scheme.
186. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing the opposing arguments and
the court's decision in Lew).
187. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
188. McNally, 483 U.S. at 356 ("[T]he phrase ["scheme to defraud"] is to be interpreted
broadly insofar as property rights are concerned .... ). The Ninth Circuit missed the general gist
of the Supreme Court's broader purpose in defining the term "to defraud" because it narrowly
focused on the specific language of the definition. See supra note 96 and accompanying text
(discussing how the Ninth Circuit found McNally to clearly require that money or property be
received from "the one who is deceived" by relying on the specific words "wronging one in his
property rights" (emphasis added)). But McNally relied on this definition of the term "to
defraud" as an indication that the term was intended to be limited to "property rights." McNally,
483 U.S. at 358. As later discussed by the same Supreme Court in United States v. Carpenter,
McNally did not distinguish whose property rights were to be affected. See Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (describing the holding in McNally as "limit[ing the mail fraud
statute] in scope to the protection of property rights").
189. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (noting that Evans acknowledged that
McNally's discussion concerning the definition of "defraud" was dicta, but nevertheless relied on
this discussion in finding that Congress may have intended the statute to be read to require
deprivation to the deceived party).
190. See United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1988). As the Second Circuit
noted,
the case before us today does not require us to decide this general question. As already
quoted, the Supreme Court has made clear that "any benefit which the Government
derives from the [wire or mail fraud] statute[s] must be limited to the Government's
interest as property-holder." This is enough for this case.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 359 n.8).
191. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Given Congress' [sic] 'broad
purpose,' I 'find it difficult to believe, absent some indication in the statute itself or the legislative
history, that Congress would have undercut sharply that purpose by hobbling federal prosecutors
in their effort to combat' use of the mails for fraudulent schemes." (citation omitted)).
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C. "Right Dealing in Business Society"
The mail fraud statute "puts its imprimatur on the accepted moral standards
and condemns conduct which fails to match the 'reflection of moral
uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play, and right dealing in the general
and business life of members of society.' According to this standard, and
in consideration of the totality of the circumstances involved, a defendant who
obtains his victims' trust through fraudulent associations to appear as though
he has their best interests in mind should not be acquitted on the basis of the
identity of the person to whom he made his misrepresentations.193 The mail
and wire fraud statutes do not require a misrepresentation to be made at all;
they require only the existence of a scheme and a mailing or the use of the
wires sufficiently related to the scheme. 194
The basis of the fraud perpetrated against Arthur and Thomas Walker was
the concealment of a material fact that may have been pertinent to their
decision to trust Newmark's agent and subsequently invest with his brokerage
firm. 195  Newmark and his agent disregarded the adequacy of the
recommended investment in an attempt to defraud the Walkers of the large
commissions that accompanied a $3.5 million dollar account. 196 The fax sent
to Morgan Stanley, fraudulent in its own right because it contained a statement
that blatantly disregarded the truth, was the vehicle used to carry out the
scheme, and therefore, was sufficiently related to the scheme to establish the
required nexus between the use of the wires and the scheme.
192. Blackly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Gregory v. United
States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958)).
193. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cit. 1941) (stating that "[a]
scheme to get money unfairly by obtaining and then betraying the confidence of another ... [is] a
scheme to defraud though no lies were told," and it is within the prohibition of the mail fraud
statute if the mails are used in connection therewith), overruled by United States v. Cruz, 478
F.2d 408, 412 n.8 (5th Cir. 1973); see also supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text
(discussing Newmark's scheme to defraud Arthur and Thomas Walker by betraying their
confidence).
194. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (setting out the elements needed to prove mail
or wire fraud). The existence of a misrepresentation is circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove
the existence of a scheme to defraud. See United States v. Newmark, 374 F. App'x 279, 282 (3d
Cir. 2010) (finding that misrepresentations made to the Morgan Stanley compliance officer were
circumstantial evidence as to whether Newmark devised or participated in a scheme to defraud
but were sufficient for a jury to rely on in finding him guilty). Therefore, a scheme to defraud can
exist even absent a misrepresentation, let alone a direct misrepresentation. See United States v.
Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1981) ("A defendant's activities can be a scheme or
artifice to defraud whether or not any specific misrepresentations are involved.").
195. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing how Newmark gained the
Walkers' confidence by holding himself out to be an attorney).
196. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A defendant's activities should be considered a scheme to defraud even if no
misrepresentations have been made, let alone a specific misrepresentation to
the party being defrauded. Interpreting the statute to require a direct
misrepresentation to the alleged victim to prove a "scheme to defraud" limits
the statute's reach. Although there is some danger in construing such a liberal
interpretation of the broad language in the mail and wire fraud statutes,' 97 the
Supreme Court should have confidence in the abilities of judges and juries to
differentiate between fraudulent intent and mere distasteful tactics. When
fraudulent intent is clearly shown, behavior should not be excused because a
scheme involves only indirect misrepresentation. As relevant schemes have
evolved and expanded throughout history, so, too, have the mail and wire fraud
statutes.' 98  With the evolution of modem technology comes more
sophisticated schemes involving greater complexity in scope and execution.
Limiting the mail and wire fraud statutes to cover only the simplest and most
direct misrepresentations is contrary to the manifest purpose of the statutes.
197. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional concept of fair
notice in criminal prosecutions).
198. See Rakoff, supra note 9, at 772. As one commentator has observed,
the mail fraud statute . . . has been characterized as the "first line of defense" against
virtually every new area of fraud to develop in the United States ....
. . . [B]oth Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly placed their stamps of
approval on expansive use of the mail fraud statute. Indeed, each of the . . . legislative
revisions of the statute has served to enlarge its coverage.
Id.
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